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SOCIAL MEDIA AND FEDERAL PROSECUTION: A CIRCUIT 
SPLIT ON CYBERCRIME AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
Melissa Anne Springer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is nine o’clock on a Monday morning. With a hot cup of coffee in 
your hand, you sit down at your computer. You use your company-
provided credentials to log into the computer and then the company 
intranet. However, before you can even open the privileged document 
you were assigned last week, you receive a text from a friend cryptically 
praising a photo he saw of you from the weekend. Unsure whether it is a 
picture of you and your newborn nephew cuddling on the couch, or a 
not-so-flattering picture of you from Saturday night, you log into 
Facebook on your work computer. Although the company handbook 
strictly forbids personal use of a company computer, you must check 
this picture immediately. Plus, other colleagues check social media 
while at work. You never do and, you think, what harm could possibly 
come from just this one time? 
Facebook loads; you check the recent posts you were tagged in; and a 
picture of you and your nephew appears. You are about to respond to 
your friend’s text when your supervisor turns the corner, glances at your 
screen, and asks you to accompany him to his office. He fires you on the 
spot for violating provisions of the company handbook. You pack up 
your things and leave the office. 
A month later, someone knocks on your door, confirms your name, 
and hands you a package. Before he walks away, he says, “You’ve been 
served.” Bewildered, you call an attorney and review the complaint. 
Apparently, the company who fired you for checking Facebook is now 
suing you for “intentionally access[ing] a computer without 
authorization or exceed[ing] authorization.”1 
Although alleged violations involve various relationships, the 
overwhelming majority of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (the 
“CFAA”) claims, like the hypothetical presented above, arise out of an 
employer-employee relationship or the following relationships: 162 
filings (50%) as employees, consultants, or contractors; 97 filings (30%) 
as competitors; 42 filings (13%) as technology service providers; 29 
filings (9%) as derivative businesses; 24 filings (7%) as business 
 
            * Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (2016).  
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partners; 22 filings (7%) as unnamed positions; 16 filings (5%) claiming 
no substantial relationships; 8 filings (2%) as customers or users; and 6 
filings (2%) as employers.2 
Even though the scenario above may not have transpired under the 
various circuit court interpretations of the CFAA, it illustrates the 
CFAA’s broad application. The majority of CFAA allegations do not 
involve “hacking” but, instead, are “construed broadly” to contain any 
of the following allegations: 170 filings (52%) for misappropriation of 
information; 71 filings (22%) for editing or deleting information; 41 
filings (13%) for invasion of privacy; 40 filings (12%) for accessing 
another person’s account; 26 filings (8%) for financial misfeasance 
and/or hijacking another person’s account; 20 filings (6%) for 
impersonation; 18 filings (6%) for misappropriating a computer system; 
16 filings (5%) for unlocking mobile phones; 14 filings (4%) for 
software disruptions of computer systems; 11 filings (3%) for credential 
sharing and/or harassment; 9 filings (3%) for an unrelated website; 8 
filings (3%) for copyright trolling; 7 filings (2%) for spam calls or 
emails; 6 filings (2%) for malware and/or reverse engineering; and 5 
filings (2%) for physical disruptions of computer systems and/or 
automated website interactions and/or modifications to enterprise 
software.3 The circuit courts are split on whether the CFAA affords a 
broad application of the civil actions arising out of various alleged cyber 
infractions or whether application of CFAA requires the rule of lenity, 
wherein courts should narrowly apply the statute. 
This Article first provides a general overview of the CFAA and then 
analyzes the current circuit split. The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits 
apply a narrow definition under the rule of lenity. The First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits advocate a broader application. After the 
circuit split analysis, this Article argues that the narrow approach and 
the rule of lenity should be applied when analyzing CFAA violations in 
order to give effect to Congress’s intentions and to protect ordinary and 
innocent citizens from federal prosecution. This Article then proceeds to 
discuss pending district court cases and concludes that those district 
courts, or their respective circuit courts if the case is appealed, should 
apply the narrow definition of “unauthorized access” and “exceeds 
authorized access.” 
 
 2. Jonathan Mayer, Article: Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1480-81 (2016) 
(hereinafter Mayer, Cyber Litigation) (further noting that “[t]he overwhelming majority of private 
cybercrime claims arise in business disputes (238, 73%), and of those, most follow from previous 
employment (168, 52%)”). 
 3. Id. at 1482. 
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II.  BACKGROUND ON THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT 
“Everything has a computer in it nowadays.”4  Although a single 
computer originally filled an entire room,5 computers today are so 
innovative that we can wear them on our wrists.6  We use computers to 
research case law, to check the daily news, to make phone or video calls, 
to help monitor our health, to store credit card numbers and make 
payments, and more.  In essence, “[c]omputers now dominate nearly 
every aspect of our lives.”7  Because of their prevalence and dominance 
in our lives, more than half of the world’s population has been the 
victims of cybercrime8 and about 65% of businesses “reported some 
form of unauthorized use of their computer system.”9  Through a 
congressional act to prevent future damage to computers, individuals, or 
businesses, these cybercrimes are classified as both federal crimes10 and 
fraudulent acts subject to civil remedies.11 
Although originally enacted by Congress in 198412 to prosecute 
hackers,13 the CFAA now provides a private right of action for various 
 
 4. Shawn E. Tuma, What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care? – A Primer on the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil Litigation, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 144 (2011) [hereinafter Tuma, 
Why Should I Care?] (quoting United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Mark Milian, Apple’s Steve Wozniak: “We’ve Lost A Lot of Control,” CNN, (Dec. 8, 2010, 12:16 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/innovation/12/08/steve.wozniak.computers)). 
 5. See John Kopplin, An Illustrated History of Computers Part 4 (2002), 
http://www.computersciencelab.com/ComputerHistory/HistoryPt4.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).  
 6. Such computers and innovative technology has led to “smartwatches,” a compact computer 
device.  See e.g. Scott Stein, Apple Watch Review – Apple Watch One Year In: My (Kinda Sorta) 
Everyday Companion, CNET, (May 3, 2016), https://www.cnet.com/products/apple-watch.  
 7. Tuma, Why Should I Care?, supra note 4, at 144. 
 8. Id. at 146. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (citing Amber L. Leaders, Note, Gimme a Brekka!: Deciphering “Authorization” Under 
the CFAA and How Employers Can Protect Their Data, 6 WASH. J. L., TECH. & ARTS 285, 288 
(2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2006) (“The CFAA states in relevant part that whoever 
‘intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
obtains . . . information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer . . .  
or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer' commits a federal crime”)). 
 11. Id. at 146-147 (citing Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics v. Capstone Orthopedic, Inc., 556 F. 
Supp. 2d 1122, 1131 (E.D. Cal 2008) (explaining that, as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), the term 
“‘defraud’ . . . simply means wrongdoing”)). 
 12. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(explaining how Congress first passed the Counterfeit Access Devise and Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act in 1984 and then revised and expanded the CFAA in 1986, naming it the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1986). 
 13. Congress enacted the CFAA to “enhance the government’s ability to prosecute computer 
crimes” and originally “target[ed] hackers who accessed computer to steal information or to disrupt or 
destroy computer functionality, as well as criminals who possessed the capacity to ‘access and control 
high technology processes vital to our everyday lives . . . .’” LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 
1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting H.R. Rep. 98-894, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3694 (July 24, 1984)).   
3
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cyber infractions.14 “The CFAA prohibits (1) the unauthorized accessing 
(2) of a ‘protected’ computer (3) with the intent either (a) to obtain 
information, (b) to further a fraud, or (c) to damage the computer or its 
data.”15  However, to receive compensatory damages, injunctive relief, 
or other equitable relief under the CFAA, the injured party must meet 
the qualifying $5,000 loss in a one-year period.16   
A “protected” computer is any computer “that is used in a manner 
that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the 
United States.”17  The injured party may file a claim against anyone who 
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access . . . .”18  However, the extent of an employee’s 
authorized access may be difficult to determine because “unauthorized 
access” may depend upon the company’s procedures and policies, the 
employee’s employment period, or the explicit authorized or un-
authorized permission of any single employee.19 Furthermore, the time 
at which the alleged “unauthorized access” occurred is also pertinent.20  
To satisfy the third prong of the statute, the offender’s intent is 
broadly construed.21 However, “anything of value” does provide a slight 
limitation on the otherwise broad definition of obtaining information.22  
Similarly, the CFAA does not fully define the element of fraud. The 
case law provides that CFAA fraud is not the same as common law 
fraud.23 Common law fraud requires actual knowledge,24 while CFAA 
 
 14. John DiGiacomo, Civil Actions Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
REVISION/LEGAL (February 4, 2015), ¶ 1, https://revisionlegal.com/internet-lawyer/civil-actions-
computer-fraud-abuse-act [hereafter DiGiacomo, Civil Actions]; see also Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1132 
(providing a five-part test as applicable to that case: “(1) intentionally accessed a computer, (2) without 
authorization or exceeding authorized access, and that [the defendant] (3) thereby obtained information 
(4) from any protected computer (if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication), and 
that (5) there was a loss to one or more persons during any one-year period aggregating at least $5,000 
in value.”). 
 15. DiGiacomo, Civil Actions, supra note 14, at ¶ 1.  
 16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2016). 
 17. A “protected” computer includes any computer that is used in interstate or foreign 
commerce, including computers physically “located outside the United States that [are] used in a 
manner that affects intestate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(e)(2) (2016). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2016). 
 19. DiGiacomo, Civil Actions, supra note 14, at ¶ 4 (“determining an employee’s level of 
authorized access can be tricky . . . [and] the timeline of employment is important . . . .”).  
 20. See id.  
 21. An injured party may have a claim against “whoever . . . knowingly . . . accesses a protected 
computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and . . . obtains anything of value . . . .” 
18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4) (2016). 
 22. DiGiacomo, Civil Actions, supra note 14, at ¶ 7 (“the language ‘anything of value’ has 
limited it somewhat”). 
 23. Id. at ¶ 8 (citing eBay Inc. v, Digital Point Solutions, Inc., 608 F.Supp.2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (CFAA fraud claim requires a demonstration of unlawful access but not the elements of common 
4
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fraud is a “wrongful action,”25 requiring constructive knowledge. Courts 
have determined that “unlawful access” may establish an intent to 
defraud.26  In stark contrast to both the intent to obtain and the intent to 
defraud, the intent to cause loss or damage is more significantly defined 
within the CFAA.27 
The penalties associated with a CFAA violation depend upon the 
severity of the offense and the harm caused.28 Once a court determines a 
violation has occurred, “[a] court may award successful plaintiffs 
compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and other equitable relief.”29 
However, plaintiffs claiming a minimum aggregate loss of “$5,000 can 
only receive monetary damages.”30 Finally, the statute of limitations on 
a CFAA claim begins to run two years from “when the damage resulting 
from the alleged unauthorized access is discovered.”31 
III.  CIRCUIT DECISION SPLIT ON APPLYING THE CFAA 
Since the CFAA’s enactment in 1984, the computer industry has 
grown and evolved and computer use has seen an exponential increase 
in all aspects of business and social life.32 Although Congress originally 
intended the CFAA to prosecute hackers’ unauthorized access,33 
hundreds of complaints under the CFAA have been brought by 
businesses,34 resulting in a circuit split on whether the CFAA applies to 
non-hacker claims alleging current or former employees exceeded their 
“authorized access” of a “protected” computer.  
 
law fraud)). 
 24. See id. (citing Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 725 F.Supp 2d. 887, 994 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (holding no reason for former employee to believe employer granted him unlimited access to 
secure website when provided with an employee login and password because employee knew of 
employer’s computer network policy restricting such access by a non-employee and therefore acted with 
“intent to defraud”)). 
 25. Id. (citing Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F.Supp. 2d 
1121, 1126 (W.D. Wash. 2000)). 
 26. Id. (citing eBay, 608 F.Supp.2d at 1164). 
 27. The CFAA defines damages as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a 
program, a system, or information.”  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2016).  Loss is defined as “any reasonable 
cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and 
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue 
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.”  18 
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (2016). 
 28. 4-84 Cipes, Bernstein & Hall, Andrew Grosso, Criminal Defense Techniques § 84.04(2)(a) 
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (2016). 
 29. DiGiacomo, Civil Actions, supra note 14, at ¶ 10 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2016)). 
 30. Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
 31. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2016)).  
 32. See Tuma, Why Should I Care?, supra note 4, at 144. 
 33. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 34. Mayer, Cyber Litigation, supra note 2. 
5
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A.  Circuit Split: The Broad Application 
The broad reading of the CFAA’s “unauthorized access” 35 essentially 
extends CFAA liability to any and all employees—both current and 
former—and “punish[es] anyone who uses a computer wrongly.”36 For 
former employees, an employer may file suit for unauthorized access of 
a protected computer upon an employee’s termination if that employee 
accessed an employer’s computer after termination.37  Furthermore, a 
current employee may be liable under the CFAA for obtaining personal 
information for non-business reasons.38 Such a broad application may be 
justified via contract theory and agency theory.39 By applying contract 
theory, “the law punishes persons who use a computer in a way that 
violates a contract or terms of service.”40 Similarly, agency law 
“punishes any employee who acts contrary to the interests of the 
employer.”41 
In 2006, the Seventh Circuit broadly applied the CFAA when, after 
receiving a laptop from his employer to use for work purposes, the 
employee quit and deleted all the data from the laptop by transmitting an 
erase program to the computer.42 The court applied common law agency 
principals and concluded that, because the employee breached his duty 
of loyalty to his employer,43 the employee’s relationship with the 
employer was terminated.44 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that an 
employee’s authority to access information was immediately rescinded 
upon termination of employment.45  Therefore, if a former employee 
accesses a computer after termination, his access is not authorized and 
 
 35. The CFAA defines “exceeds authorized access” as “to access a computer with authorization 
and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so 
to obtain or alter.”  18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2016). 
 36. Michael C. Mikulic, The Unconstitutionality of The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 30 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 175, 176 (2016) (hereinafter Mikulic, CFAA 
Unconstitutional). 
 37. See generally WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 38. See generally United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2nd Cir. 2015).  
 39. Mikulic, CFAA Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 176. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 43. Id. at 420 (The employee breached his duty of loyalty “when, having already engaged in 
misconduct and decided to quit [the company] in violation of his employment contract, he resolved to 
destroy files that incriminated himself and other files that were also the property of his employer, in 
violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on an employee”). 
 44. Id. at 421 (“Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of the agent terminates if, without 
knowledge of the principal, [the employee-defendant] acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise 
guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal”). 
 45. Id. (The defendant’s “breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relationship . . . and 
with it his authority to access the laptop”). 
6
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he is in violation of the CFAA.46 
Four years later, the Eleventh47 and Fifth48 Circuits followed a similar 
path as the Seventh Circuit and broadly interpreted “exceeds authorized 
access.” In United States v. Rodriguez, an employee worked for the 
Social Security Administration and used his credentials and login 
information to obtain personal information of seventeen people the 
employee knew for non-business purposes.49 This action fell under the 
Eleventh Circuit’s definition of “exceeds authorized access.”50  
Similarly, in United States v. John, an employee accessed confidential 
customer account information and used that information to defraud 
those customers and her employer.51 The Fifth Circuit added a mens rea 
element when applying a similarly broad definition of “exceeds 
authorized access.” This criminalized any unauthorized access, 
including limits on the use of information “when the user knows or 
reasonably should know that he or she is not authorized to access a 
computer and information obtainable from that access in furtherance of 
or to perpetuate a crime.” 52 
Finally, the First Circuit broadly applied the CFAA when the 
defendant worked for the employer but decided to open his own 
competing business.53 In doing so, the employee hired a computer 
consultant to create a program that would compile information from the 
former employer’s website so that the defendant could undercut prices.54 
The First Circuit held that the broad confidentiality agreement between 
the employee and the employer, which was also signed by the 
defendant, meant that the defendant “exceeded authorized access” 
because authorized access did not include obtaining proprietary 
information.55 
B.  Circuit Split: The Narrow Application 
In contrast to the broad application of the CFAA’s “exceeds 
authorized access,” wherein essentially any action taken by an employee 
 
 46. Id. at 420-421. 
 47. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 48. See United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 49. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260.  
 50. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263 (the defendant “exceeded his authorized access and violated the 
[CFAA] when he obtained personal information for a nonbusiness reason”). 
 51. John, 597 F.3d at 269. 
 52. Id. at 271. 
 53. See generally EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 54. Id. at 578.  
 55. Id. at 581 (“because of the broad confidentiality agreement[,] appellants’ actions ‘exceeded 
authorized access’”).   
7
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that is considered outside the realm of employment may be considered a 
violation, the narrow application applies the rule of lenity, looking to 
Congress’ intended purpose behind the CFAA: to prevent hackers from 
wreaking havoc on corporate mainframes and gaining access to 
proprietary information.56 
The Fourth57 and Ninth58 Circuits first delved into the true purpose 
intended by Congress in 2012. In WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC 
v. Miller, the employee was provided with a laptop, a cellphone, and the 
authority to access the company’s intranet and computer services.59 
Upon resignation, the employee presented his new employer with his 
former employer’s proprietary business information taken from the 
laptop with which the previous employer had supplied him.60 Although 
the facts of Miller are similar to those facts analyzed by the First 
Circuit61, the Fourth Circuit did not apply a broad definition of “exceeds 
authorized access.” Instead, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the CFAA 
literally and narrowly: “‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeds authorized 
access’ . . . apply only when an individual accesses a computer without 
permission or obtains or alters information on a computer beyond that 
which he is authorized to access.”62  
In United States v. Nosal, the defendant, after resigning from the 
company, asked current employees to download client lists and client 
contact information from the company’s confidential database and send 
it to the defendant.63 The Ninth Circuit took a literal and narrow 
approach; however, it went a step further by focusing solely on the word 
“access” within the CFAA’s “exceeds authorized access.”64 The court 
noted that the CFAA does not mention “exceeds authorized use;” it only 
mentions “exceeds authorized access.”65 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held 
 
 56. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The act was 
originally designed to target hackers who accessed computers to steal information or to disrupt or 
destroy computer functionality, as well as criminals who possessed the capacity to access and control 
high technology processes vital to our everyday lives . . . .’”). 
 57. See generally WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201-207 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
 58. See generally United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856-864 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 59. WEC Carolina Energy, 687 F.3d at 202. 
 60. Id. at 201. 
 61. Similar to the facts in WEC Carolina Energy, the pertinent facts of the First Circuit case 
included a former employer using a former employer’s proprietary business information to help a new, 
current employer succeed. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 578-80 (1st Cir. 
2011).  
 62. WEC Carolina Energy, 687 F.3d at 206.  
 63. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856. 
 64. Id. at 863 (“[T]he phrase ‘exceeds authorized access’ in the CFAA does not extend to 
violations of use restrictions.”). 
 65. Id. at 857 (The government’s argument—CFAA “language could refer to someone who has 
unrestricted physical access to a computer, but is limited in the use to which he can put the 
8
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“exceeds authorized access” extends only to violations of restrictions on 
access to information; it does not extend to restrictions on the 
information’s use.66 
After the 2012 decisions by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the circuit 
courts did not analyze CFAA claims under the narrow approach until 
2015. In United States v. Valle, the defendant was a police officer and an 
active member of an Internet fetish community.67 As a member of the 
Internet community, he vividly discussed what he desired to do to his 
friends and family with numerous other users.68 The defendant also used 
his login credentials to access information he was authorized to access 
but accessed that information for personal use, something that was 
prohibited under the police department’s rules.69 As the most recent 
Circuit Court case speaking to Congress’ intent for CFAA claims, the 
Second Circuit applied the rule of lenity and read the statute narrowly.70 
However, unlike the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, the Second Circuit 
acknowledged that the CFAA might take both a broad and a narrow 
interpretation.71 As such, the Second Circuit claimed to be required to 
“apply the rule of lenity and adopt the latter construction.”72 In so doing, 
the court stated that it would narrowly construe the CFAA in order to 
ensure that Congress writes the law and the courts interpret the law.73 A 
broader decision could (and would) affect not only the defendant in this 
case but also any person who stumbles upon information on a computer 
he or she is not authorized to see, although he or she is authorized to 
access the computer.74 
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit’s narrow construction of the 
CFAA and refusal to “uphold a highly problematic interpretation of a 
statute,” demonstrates their desire to protect the millions of ordinary and 
 
information”—“is a poor fit with the statutory language.” Therefore, “‘[e]xceeds authorized access’ 
would refer to data or files on a computer that one is not authorized to access.”). 
 66. Id. at 863-864 (“we hold that ‘exceeds authorized access’ in the CFAA is limited to 
violations of restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use) (emphasis in original). 
 67. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 512 (2nd Cir. 2015). 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  at 512-513.  
 70. Id. at 523 (“The rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning of what 
constitutes criminal conduct, minimizes the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, and strikes the 
appropriate balance between the legislature and the court in defining criminal liability”).  
 71. Id. at 512 (“the CFAA permit[s] both interpretations”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 528 (“[T]he rule of lenity requires that Congress, not the courts or the prosecutors, 
must decide whether conduct is criminal”).  
 74. See id. at 528 (“We, on the other hand, are obligated to ‘construe criminal statutes narrowly 
so that Congress will not unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals.’”) (quoting United States 
v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
9
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innocent citizens of the United States.75  
IV.  ARGUMENT 
As the Second Circuit acknowledged, the meaning of “exceeds 
authorized access” and “unauthorized access” may be construed both 
broadly and narrowly.76 Although the broad definition and application in 
each specific case appears logical, these circuit courts looked only to the 
defendant’s culpability and failed to consider the impact such decisions 
would render on other citizens.77 In contrast, the narrow definition and 
application protects the millions of unsuspecting citizens from criminal 
and civil liability. Courts should continue refusing to “uphold a highly 
problematic interpretation of a statute.”78 Thus, going forward, courts 
should embrace the narrow application for numerous reasons. First, 
“exceeds authorized access” and “without authorization” should be 
defined in the narrowest sense to protect Congress’s intention to 
prosecute “hackers,” not individuals acting within their authorized scope 
but for unapproved uses. Second, the CFAA applies to the authorized or 
unauthorized access of protected computers, not both the unauthorized 
access and unauthorized use of materials obtained during either 
authorized or unauthorized access.  
A.  Promises Are Not Worth Their Weight: Prosecuting Ordinary 
Citizens 
“Exceeds authorized access” and “without authorization” should be 
defined in the narrowest sense to protect Congress’s intent to prosecute 
“hackers,” not individuals acting within their authorized scope but for 
unapproved uses. Simply, “the broad interpretation approach is unfair to 
the American people.”79 
As computers became more prevalent and abundant in everyday life, 
Congress responded by enacting the CFAA; its goal was to prosecute 
hackers and other illegal, unauthorized access of protected computers in 
order to safeguard proprietary information stored on computer 
mainframes across the United States.80 Although Congress’s intention 
 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 512.  
 77. Id. at 527 (“[C]ourts that have adopted the broader construction looked only at the culpable 
behavior of the defendants before them, and failed to consider the effect on millions of ordinary citizens 
caused by the statute’s unitary definition of ‘exceeded authorized access.’”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 78. Id.  at 528.  
 79. See Mikulic, CFAA Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 188. 
 80. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The act was 
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may have been well intended in 1984,81 certain circuit courts broadly 
apply the CFAA—specifically “unauthorized access” and “exceeds 
authorized access”—in order to ensure punishment of anyone who 
violates the CFAA.82   
In Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly mentioned that, under 
the CFAA, it was a crime to “intentionally access[] a computer without 
authorization or exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain[] 
information from any department or agency of the United States.”83 
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the CFAA defined 
“exceeds authorized access” as “to access a computer with authorized 
access and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the 
computer that the accessor is not entitled to obtain or alter.”84 From this 
point, however, the court went amiss in its analysis. By holding 
Rodriguez liable under the CFAA because “the Administration told 
[him] that he was not authorized to obtain personal information for 
nonbusiness reasons,”85 the Eleventh Circuit allowed individuals, 
businesses, and courts to broadly construe and criminalize restrictions 
privately placed on an individual’s duties and responsibilities while at 
work.86  Therefore, not only may an employee face termination from a 
position, but she may also face federal prosecution for actions as 
mundane as accessing Facebook during work to check a photo in which 
she was tagged.87 “We think, and therefore we Google,”88 Facebook, 
tweet, Instragram, and Snapchat. Thus, “[c]ourts should not lightly 
conclude that visiting an unwelcome URL should subject a person to 
 
originally designed to target hackers who accessed computers to steal information or to disrupt or 
destroy computer functionality, as well as criminals who possessed the capacity to ‘access and control 
high technology processes vital to our everyday live . . . .’”). 
 81. See WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 82. The Circuit Courts broadly applying the CFAA include the First Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, the 
Seventh Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit, as noted above. See generally Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. 
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica Inc., 274 
F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 83. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at1263 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B)) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
 84. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).  
 85. Id. 
 86. In Rodriguez, the Administration’s policy—regarding employee use of its databases—
authorized access only to the extent that the employee obtained personal information for business 
purposes. Although Rodriguez conceded that he had obtained information without a business purpose, 
he had general authorization to access the information he obtained. See id. at 1260.  
 87. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Under the government’s 
proposed interpretation of the CFAA, posting for sale an item prohibited by Craigslist’s policy . . . will 
earn you a handsome orange jumpsuit.”). 
 88. Olin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1165 (2016). 
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arrest by federal agents and the potential for jail time.”89 
Contrast the factual circumstances in Rodriguez with those in Valle: 
Valle used his law enforcement credentials to access and search for 
individuals without a “law enforcement purpose.”90 In both cases, the 
defendants were granted access to personal information of other 
individuals and both defendants abused that power. However, the 
rulings in Rodriguez91 and in Valle92 are contradictory to one another. 
Any possible scenario criminalizing one individual’s access while not 
criminalizing another’s seems contrary to Congress’s initial intent 
within the CFAA: to prosecute hackers and protect information stored 
within computers.93 
By broadly applying “unauthorized access” or “exceeds authorized 
access,” the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts looked 
only to the defendant’s culpability and failed to consider the impact such 
decisions would render on other citizens. However, the remedy available 
that protects “millions of ordinary citizens”94 is for the courts to apply to 
rule of lenity95 under the CFAA because 
 
[18 U.S.C. §] 1030(a)(2)(B) is ambiguous and where, as here, the 
Government and the defense both posit plausible interpretations of 
a criminal stature, the rule of lenity requires [courts] to adopt the 
defendant’s construction . . . . When a reasonable doubt persists 
about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the language 
and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the 
statute, [the courts] resolve the doubt in favor of the defendant 
rather than imputing to Congress an undeclared will to criminalize 
conduct.96 
 
Thus, the narrow view should be applied in CFAA cases involving 
“unauthorized access” or “exceeds authorized access” in order to protect 
ordinary citizens. 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 513 (2nd Cir. 2015). 
 91. The Eleventh Circuit held that “[the defendant] exceeded his authorized access and violated 
the [CFAA] when he obtained personal information for a nonbusiness purpose.” Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 
1263.   
 92. The Second Circuit ruled in favor of Valle, applying “the rule of lenity to adopt the 
interpretation that favors the defendant,” because a broad constructive of the CFAA could find culpable 
behavior in “millions of ordinary citizens.” Valle, 807 F.3d at 526-528.  
 93. See LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 94. Valle, 807 F.3d at 527. 
 95. The rule of lenity “ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning of what constitutes 
criminal conduct, minimizes the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, and strikes the appropriate 
balance between the legislature and the court in determining criminal liability.” Id. at 523.  
 96. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  
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The Second Circuit acknowledged that, while a broad application 
would prosecute individuals “who improperly access information from a 
government computer—a result that some readers might find palatable,” 
their “construction of the statute impacts many more people than [the 
defendant].” 97  As explained in Nosal, “[b]ecause ‘protected computer’ 
is defined as a computer affected by or involved in interstate 
commerce—effectively all computers with Internet access—the 
government’s interpretation of ‘exceeds authorized access’ makes every 
violation of a private computer use policy a federal crime.”98  
Although there may be merits in imposing criminal liability in one 
specific case, the courts “must construe the statute knowing that our 
interpretation of ‘exceeds authorized access’ [and ‘unauthorized access’] 
will govern many other situations.”99 Despite promises by the 
Government or other organizations that they “would not prosecute an 
individual for checking Facebook at work,”100 the courts should not 
“take prosecutors at their word in such matters. A court should not 
uphold a highly problematic interpretation of a statute merely because 
the Government promises to use it responsibly.”101 
Regardless of any Government or organizational promise, “exceeds 
authorization” and “without authorization” should be defined in the 
narrowest sense to protect Congress’s intention to prosecute “hackers,” 
not individuals acting within their authorized scope but for unapproved 
uses. 
B.  Promises Are Not Worth Their Weight: Differences Between 
“Access” and “Use” 
How to apply the CFAA boils down to two words: access and use. 
Generally, the CFAA applies to the authorized or unauthorized access of 
protected computers and not both the unauthorized access and 
unauthorized use of materials obtained during authorized access. If 
courts were to construe the CFAA to include both access and use of 
materials, then this broad application could become a powerful tool, 
creating a sharp increase in CFAA civil litigation claims that alleged 
computer authorization violations.102 
 
 97. Id. at 528. 
 98. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 99. Valle, 807 F.3d at 528. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. See Mayer, Cyber Litigation, supra note 2, at 1462, 1472-1474 (“Civil cybercrime litigation 
has unambiguously exploded . . . . [D]istrict court opinions surged by over an order of magnitude. The 
federal appellate courts have also been reviewing civil CFAA disputes at an increasing rate . . . . Private 
cybercrime claims are on the rise in federal district courts and in every regional court of appeals, with 
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The Second Circuit explained that the Senate Committee Report 
issued regarding the 1986 amendments “specifically described exceeds 
authorized access in terms of trespassing into computer systems or 
files.”103 The Second Circuit further noted that the Committee 
 
did not want to hold liable those who inadvertently stumble into 
someone else’s computer file or computer data, which was 
particularly true in those cases where an individual is authorized to 
sign onto an use a particular computer, but subsequently exceeds 
his authorized access by mistakenly entering another computer or 
data file that happens to be accessible from the same terminal.104 
 
The Senate Committee also noted that “section 1030 deals with an 
‘unauthorized access’ concept of computer fraud rather than the mere 
use of a computer.”105 
Generally, an employee has authorized access when “his employer 
approves or sanctions his admission to that computer . . . [and he] 
accesses a computer ‘without authorization’ when he gains admission to 
a computer without approval.”106  Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit 
defined “exceeds authorized access” as when an employee “has 
approval to access a computer, but uses his access to obtain or alter 
information that falls outside the bounds of his approved access.”107  
Thus, neither of these definitions applies to an employee’s “improper 
use of information validly accessed.”108 In sum, the CFAA looks solely 
to how an alleged violator accessed the information; it does not look to 
how the alleged violator used the information so long as he had 
authorization. If the CFAA considered how an employee or former 
employee used the information, “[e]mployers also would be equipped 
with a powerful civil cudgel against their former employees, enabling 
retaliation for exercising legal rights or whistleblowing.”109 Such a 
powerful tool could create (and has already created) a sharp increase in 
CFAA civil litigation claims alleging computer authorization 
violations.110 
Although “Congress may have intended to open the federal 
 
the sole exception of the D.C. Circuit. . . . This sudden surge in civil cybercrime litigation suggests that 
cases are motivated by shifts in litigation strategy . . . .”). 
 103. Valle, 807 F.3d. at 525 (internal quotations omitted).  
 104. Id.  (internal quotations omitted). 
 105. Id. at 525. 
 106. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012).  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 109. Mayer, Cyber Litigation, supra note 2, at 1465. 
 110. Id. at 1462, 1472. 
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courthouse door—just a crack—to claims involving routine or 
unsophisticated computer misconduct,” “Congress did not intend to 
fling the door wide open, for so much run-of-the-mill commercial 
litigation.”111 For example, the number of CFAA civil litigation claims 
has increased significantly from 1994 to 2013: between 1994 and 2005, 
the number of CFAA claims were below 25 each year; however, 
beginning in 2006, the number of claims sky-rocketed, increasing to 
almost 150 claims each year in 2011 and 2013.112 This extreme increase 
over a relatively short period of time indicates not only that computer 
use has increased significantly over the last 20 years but also “that cases 
are motivated by shifts in litigation strategy, rather than shifts in the 
underlying cybercrime problem.”113 Similarly, federal criminal 
allegations and convictions pertaining to CFAA violations have 
increased significantly over the years: the number of criminal 
prosecutions of the CFAA jumped from about 30 in 1990, to almost 130 
in 2002, slowly leveling off at around 100 each year thereafter.114 
By looking only at the access of an alleged CFAA violator, courts can 
guarantee that the scope of the statute does not extend into innocuous 
“unauthorized uses” of computers while at work.115 The courts can 
further curtail the jump in CFAA violation cases that pertain more so to 
commercial litigation as “motivated by shifts in litigation strategy, rather 
than shifts in the underlying cybercrime problem.”116 Although the 
Government has previously promised to only prosecute those violations 
truly measuring to the degree Congress intended under the CFAA, the 
courts should not “take prosecutors at their word in such matters. A 
court should not uphold a highly problematic interpretation of a statute 
merely because the Government promises to use it responsibly.”117 
V.  COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RULE OF LENITY AND APPLYING 
THE NARROW APPLICATION AND DEFINITION 
Concerned for the integrity of their personal computers, business 
computers, and the computers nationwide that contain a plethora of 
 
 111. Id. at 1503-1504. 
 112. Id. at 1473. 
 113. Id. at 1474. 
 114. Mayer, Cyber Litigation, supra note 2, at 1476.  
 115. See id. at 1506 (“Today, of course, computer systems are pervasive, have myriad of 
functions, can be shared by million of users, and are used for everyday activities . . . . Plaintiffs and 
prosecutors can craft a colorable cybercrime claim from myriad modern fact patterns, dragging the 
courts into doctrinal quagmires and chilling socially beneficial activities. . . . [However,] cybercrime law 
is an exceedingly limited mechanism for addressing online misconduct.”). 
 116. Id. at 1474, 1506. 
 117. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2nd Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). 
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sensitive information, citizens may ask, so what if Congress or the 
courts criminalize “unauthorized access” or access that “exceeds 
authorized access”?  This is one of many possible counter arguments 
as to why a broader application of the CFAA should be used rather 
than a narrower interpretation. However, such an argument is without 
merit because it overlooks the “[v]agueness doctrine [as] an 
outgrowth . . . of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”118 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that a 
person “be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”119 
Furthermore, “[t]he vagueness doctrine states a statute violates due 
process if it ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or 
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”120 Thus, a court 
must apply two separate tests to determine voidness. A statute is 
unconstitutionally void “if (a) it does not provide fair notice of what 
action violates the law, or (b) it leads to discriminatory police 
enforcement of the law.”121 However, the second test is more 
important than the first because “[w]here the legislature fails to 
provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a 
standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to 
pursue their personal predilections.”122  
Although as a best practice, it is best to avoid checking Facebook at 
work, an application so broad as to criminalize checking Facebook at 
work should not be permitted because it violates an individual’s Due 
Process rights to fair notice and non-discriminatory enforcement of the 
law.123 First, judges in the circuit courts disagree as to what 
interpretation Congress intended through “unauthorized access” or 
“exceeds authorized access.”124 If federal circuit court judges cannot 
cohesively determine a proper application of the phrases, how will 
ordinary “men of common intelligence” know the meanings? They 
cannot and will not know because (1) “the plain language of the statute 
 
 118. Mikulic, CFAA Unconstitutional, supra note 36, at 189 (quoting United States v. Williams, 
553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)) (internal quotations omitted).  
 119. Id. (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)). 
 120. Id. (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 305). 
 121. Id. at 189-190. 
 122. Id. at 191 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 123. Id. at 194 (The CFAA “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what 
conduct is prohibited under the statute” and it “is also so standardless that it leads to discriminatory law 
enforcement”). 
 124. See id. 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/9
2018] SOCIAL MEDIA AND FEDERAL PROSECUTION 331 
is vague”;125 (2) “the CFA does not explicitly inform ordinary men or 
women that a violation of a contract will result in criminal penalties”;126 
(3) “the CFAA never explicitly specifies that acting contrary to an 
employer’s interests will result in criminal penalties”;127 (4) “when the 
statute actually does provide a definition of the phrase ‘exceeds 
authorized access,’ the definition fixes nothing [because] [t]he question 
still remains over what kind of restriction it implements”;128 and (5) “the 
legislative history of the statute is ambiguous.”129 
Thus, “[a] court should not uphold a highly problematic interpretation 
of a statute merely because the Government promises to use it 
responsibly”130 and “lenity might constrain police and prosecutors by 
denying them the opportunity to augment their power by accidents [in] 
artful legislative drafting.”131 As such, regardless of any Government or 
organizational promise, “exceeds authorization” and “without 
authorization” should be defined in the narrowest sense to protect 
Congress’s intention to prosecute “hackers,” not individuals acting 
within their authorized scope but for unapproved uses. 
VI.  CFAA CONSTRUCTION IN DISTRICT COURTS 
Regarding “authorized access” and “exceeds authorized access,” all 
but three circuits132 have determined whether they apply a broad 
definition and application or whether they apply a narrow definition and 
application. This next section analyzes the various district court 
decisions within these silent circuit courts, suggesting that a narrow 
definition should be applied. 
A.  Districts for the Third Circuit: Courts Apply the Narrow Application 
Although the Third Circuit has not yet ruled on the ever-growing 
circuit split, like many of its sister courts,133 the Middle District of 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 195. Earlier in the article, Mikulic discussed the differences between contract theory 
and agency theory, noting that both “underlie the contours of a use restriction.” Id. at 188. 
 127. Id. at 195. 
 128. Id.  
 129. See id.  
 130. United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2nd Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). 
 131. Richard H. McAdams, Close Enough For Government Work? Heien’s Less-Than-
Reasonable Mistake of the Rule of Law, U. of Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, No. 
572 at 14 (2016). 
 132. The Sixth Circuit decision has not yet been discussed; however, it does appear later in this 
article. See infra, notes 152, 153, and 154.   
 133. Although the main case in focus is a case from the Middle District of Pennsylvania (see 
infra, note 134), both the Eastern District and the Western District have also adopted the narrow 
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Pennsylvania adopted the narrow application of both “authorized 
access” and “exceeds authorized access.” 
In Advanced Fluid Sys. v. Huber, the defendant-employee was an 
employee who had access to confidential information and to the 
company’s component and labor costs and project quotes.134 After the 
defendant-employee’s resignation, his former employer searched the 
defendant’s computer to ensure the company’s confidential information 
was protected.135 Furthermore, the former employer, upon restoring 
erased computer and phone data, discovered that the defendant-
employee communicated with a competing company while a full-time 
employee for the former employer.136 The former employer further 
alleged that the defendant-employee had “conspired to gain access to [] 
confidential information . . . and to use that confidential information for 
the purpose of diverting [away] business . . . .”137 
Through its narrow application, the court noted that rulings under the 
CFAA should be “based upon the plain language of the statute, 
congressional intent, and a fair and balanced evaluation of circuit court 
opinion.”138 Thus, the CFAA prohibits only “unauthorized access to 
information rather than unauthorized use of such information.”139 
B.  Districts for the Eighth Circuit: Courts Apply the Narrow 
Application  
Although not nearly exhaustive for all districts within the Eighth 
Circuit, Minnesota applied the narrow interpretation of the CFAA, 
declining “to open the doorway to federal court so expansively when 
this reach is not apparent from the plain language of the CFAA.”140 In 
Condux Int'l, Inc. v. Haugum, the former employee alleged that the 
 
application for CFAA allegations. See Carnegie Strategic Design Eng'rs, LLC v. Cloherty, No. 13-1112, 
2014 U.S Dist. LEXIS 28654, at *30 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2014) (“The scope of the CFAA does not extend 
to employees who were authorized to access the data in question, but did so in bad faith or to the future 
detriment of his former employer because [the court] interprets the term ‘authorization’ narrowly and 
finds that it does not extend to the improper use of information validly accessed.”); Brett Senior & 
Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50833, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 
2007) (wherein in the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that an access of protected computer was 
unauthorized or exceeded authorized access because the CFAA pertains to the “unauthorized 
procurement or alteration of information, not [an employee’s] misuse or misappropriation”). 
 134. Advanced Fluid Sys. v. Huber, 28 F. Supp. 3d 306, 313-314 (M.D. Pa. 2014).  
 135. Id. at 314.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 329. 
 139. Huber, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 329 (emphasis in original).  
 140. Condux Int'l, Inc. v. Haugum, D.Minn. No. 08-4824 ADM/JSM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
100949, at * 17 (Dec. 15, 2008).  
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defendant-employee had “misappropriated the confidential business 
information for his own benefit in competition with [the plaintiff].”141 
The court adopted the narrow interpretation of the CFAA because (1) 
“[w]hen a court is confronted with two rational readings of a criminal 
statute, it is required to construe the statute in favor of the defendant”; 
and (2) “[t]his rule of lenity applies to civil statutes that have criminal 
applications because courts are required to interpret such statutes 
consistently, regardless of whether the court encounters the statute in a 
criminal or noncriminal context.”142 The court further refused to apply 
the broad interpretation because it “would create a federal cause of 
action for an employer” in any situation wherein the employee has 
authorized access to information but used that information “in a manner 
adverse to the employer’s interests or in violation of a duty of 
loyalty.”143 
C.  Districts for the Tenth Circuit: Courts Apply the Narrow 
Application144 
The Tenth Circuit, to this date, has not expressed its views as to the 
circuit split between a broad and narrow definition. However, the 
District of Colorado, a district for the Tenth Circuit, has decided at least 
one case alleging CFAA violations, siding with narrow interpretation. 
In Cloudpath Networks v. Securew2 B.V., the employer provided 
services that “enable[d] secure network access on devices brought from 
outside the organization.”145 One employee worked as a “non-employee 
sales agent,” executed a non-disclosure agreement, received access to 
trade secrets, and also worked for another business. This other business, 
Securew2 B.V., did not compete with Cloudpath at the time.146 
However, the defendant, while working for Cloudpath, “allegedly began 
conspiring to steal Cloudpath’s trade secrets and thereby develop a 
 
 141. Id. at *3. 
 142. Id. at *16-17. 
 143. Id. at *17. 
 144. The Cloudpath case (see infra, note 145) discussed within the text is not the only district 
court to apply and follow the narrow definition and application. The District Court of Kansas also 
followed the narrow approach. The important facts of the case are that the defendant terminated his 
employment but took confidential work from his previous employer to a new employer; however, 
because of a computer malfunction, confidential information was made public for a short period of time, 
during which the defendant accessed the alleged confidential information. In applying the narrow 
application, the court held, “[w]hen an employee has been granted general authority to access a 
particular area of a computer or server, . . . the fact that his employer had an unexpressed desire or intent 
to limit his access to a portion of that area does not establish unauthorized access within the meaning of 
[the CFAA].” See generally, Tank Connection, LLC v. Haight, 161 F. Supp. 3d 957 (D. Kan. 2016). 
 145. Cloudpath Networks v. Securew2 B.V., 157 F. Supp. 3d 961, 966 (D. Colo. 2016).  
 146. Id. 
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competing product.”147 
To resolve the apparent conflict between the broad and narrow 
applications of the CFAA, the court stated that “the Second, Fourth, and 
Ninth Circuits reject any inquiry into an individual’s purposes for 
accessing information, instead asking only whether the individual had 
any sort of permission to access whatever information he or she 
accessed.”148 In contrast, the court noted “the First, Fifth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits [] hold that an improper purpose may cause someone 
to lose permission even if he or she would retain such permission for 
proper purposes.”149 In its analysis, the court sided with the narrow 
application because “exceeds authorized access” “does not impose 
criminal liability on individuals who are authorized to access company 
data but do so for disloyal purposes.”150 Instead, “exceeds authorized 
access” applies “only to individuals who are allowed to access a 
company computer and use that access to obtain data they are not 
allowed to see for any purpose.”151  
D.  The Sixth Circuit Is Yet to Decide the Issue 
Although the Sixth Circuit has not yet considered a CFAA allegation 
pertaining to computers, in 2011, the Sixth Circuit considered whether 
an onslaught of automated calls and emails constituted a violation of the 
CFAA.152 Through its analysis, the court relied upon LVRC Holdings 
LLC v. Brekka and found that “without authorization” and “exceeds 
authorized access” were separate and distinct.153 Thus, although the 
Sixth Circuit briefly reviewed the applicability of a CFAA allegation, 
the court did not conclude, one way or another, whether the narrow or 
broad application and interpretation of both phrases should control 
going forward; the Sixth Circuit merely repeated Brekka’s holding—
“without authorization” should be narrowly applied—without discussing 
how to apply “exceeds authorized access.”154 
 
 147. Id. at 966-967 (wherein the defendant terminated his relationship with Cloudpath but 
continued to allow Securew2 B.V to utilize his login information for Cloudpath. Defendant also 
convinced two current Cloudpath employees to join the conspiracy and to transmit information from 
Cloudpath’s systems or sabotage Cloudpath’s software systems). 
 148. Id. at 980. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 983 (emphasis added). 
 152. See Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 153. Id. at 304.  
 154. Id. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Like many of the circuit courts which adopt the narrow application of 
the CFAA’s “authorized access” and “exceeds authorized access,” 
numerous district courts are also adopting such a narrow stance of 
statutory interpretation. Henceforth, if any of those district court cases 
are appealed, the applicable circuit court should follow the Second 
Circuit’s narrow application in Valle, protecting millions of ordinary 
citizens by narrowly interpreting the statute to give effect to the plain 
meaning, as Congress intended. 
Remember the example in the introduction, wherein you were fired 
for accessing Facebook while at work. Would you—as an attorney or 
layperson—place the outcome of a possible CFAA allegation in the 
hands of the government who promises not to extend liability to you, an 
innocent person who checked Facebook? The answer is absolutely no. 
If the facts changed slightly, would you still place your faith in the 
Government’s promises? Assume that you have authorized access to use 
the computer and access certain files stored but, unbeknownst to you, 
you were not authorized to view the employee pay-rate sheets, accessing 
them inadvertently when you were pulling up other documents. The 
answer is still absolutely no.155 
Although the CFAA may be read both broadly and narrowly, only a 
narrow reading should apply because (1) “exceeds authorization” and 
“without authorization” should be defined in the most narrow sense to 
protect Congress’s intention to prosecute “hackers,” not individuals 
acting within their authorized scope but for unapproved uses; and (2) the 
CFAA applies to the authorized or unauthorized access of protected 
computers, not both the unauthorized access and unauthorized use of 
materials obtained during either authorized or unauthorized access. 
 
 
 155. Similarly, quoting Judge Kozinski in United States v. Nosal, Jonathan Mayer states “ordinary 
consumers would have to live at the mercy of [their] local prosecutor” and “posting for sale an item 
prohibited by Craigslist’s policy, or describing yourself as ‘tall, dark, and handsome,’ when you’re 
actually short and homely, will earn you a handsome orange jumpsuit.” See Mayer, Cyber Litigation, 
supra note 2, at 1464. 
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